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Abstract. We describe the Federation Semantic Attribute Mapping System 
(F-SAMS), a web services based system that automatically collects, in a trust-
worthy manner, the semantic mappings of Identity Provider (IdP) assigned at-
tributes into a federation agreed set of standard attributes. The collected 
knowledge may be used by federation service providers (SPs) to support the 
dynamic management of IdPs and their assigned attributes.  
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1 Introduction 
A federation is defined as “A collection of domains that have established trust and it 
typically includes a number of organizations that have established trust for shared 
access to a set of resources” [1]. Although the members of the federation share their 
resources with other members, they remain in complete control of them and often 
govern the authorization and access control to their resources through the use of poli-
cies about a user’s attributes. These members are known as service providers (SPs). 
The federation members who authenticate and identify the users are known as identity 
providers (IdPs), those who simply provide attributes about the users, attribute author-
ities (AAs).  
One crucial consideration when establishing a federation is reaching a common 
understanding of an accepted vocabulary for such things as the user roles and attrib-
utes (and their associated privileges) which need to be understood throughout the 
entire federation. Traditionally, the problem of federation interoperability is addressed 
by all members of the federation agreeing upon a standard set of attributes that will be 
assigned to all users by the IdPs/AAs and will be used in access control decisions by 
the SPs. This is the approach adopted by the UK Access Management Federation 
(UKAMF) [2], which passes eduPerson attributes [3] between federation members. 
However, this approach is not scalable and can be difficult to maintain by IdPs and 
AAs when they have large numbers of users, and/or are members of multiple federa-
tions, as the new federation agreed attributes may need to be assigned (or mapped) to 
each of their users. It also poses difficulties for SPs, since they need to be sure that 
each IdP/AA is a trusted member of the appropriate federation and is entitled to as-
sign the federation attributes that it does. The UKAMF partially addresses this prob-
lem by regularly distributing metadata between its members, which lists details about 
the current members of the federation. But it does not yet fully address the trust is-
sues. But by not supporting the federation agreed set of standard attributes, the situa-
tion is worse, since SPs will not be able to interpret the semantics of attributes origi-
nating from IdPs and AAs outside their domain. However the current federation solu-
tion does not mirror the existing physical world. 
Consider a university which gets applications for its degree courses from students 
from every country of the world. Each student presents his/her original paper qualifi-
cation certificates which are issued by different educational organizations the world 
over. These have different grading schemes, different pass marks, and different levels 
of attainment, in short, different attributes issued by different authorities. But the 
admissions officer needs to know how each of these qualifications maps into the local 
ones that he is familiar with, in order to know if the student is sufficiently qualified to 
enroll on the degree course. In the UK, some help is at hand from UK Naric 
(http://www.naric.org.uk), which provides a directory of foreign educational institu-
tions, the qualifications they offer, and a best guestimate mapping of these into their 
equivalent UK counterpart. But the mapping is advisory only and each UK admis-
sions officer has to make his own decisions about the trustworthiness and mapping of 
the foreign qualification attribute. Germany has a more advanced system, in that Uni-
Assist (http://www.uni-assist.de) acts as a trusted third party and provides validated 
mappings of foreign qualifications into their German equivalent. In order to validate 
the authenticity of the paper certificate, the student has to have it stamped by the 
German embassy in its country of issuance. 
Our Federation Semantic Attribute Mapping System (F-SAMS) system is designed 
to more closely mirror, and improve upon, the physical world by:  
i) allowing IdPs and AAs to send their locally assigned roles and attributes 
to SPs, rather than having to send a set of standard federation agreed at-
tributes 
ii) automating the collection of IdP and AA issued roles and attributes as 
well as their semantic mappings into a set of federation agreed attributes 
(the knowledgebase), and   
iii) using a novel trust model, builds a trust base that allows SPs to automat-
ically validate unknown IdPs and AAs and their attributes.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows; section 2 describes the F-
SAMS model; section 3 describes the attribute mappings; section 4 explains the 
crawler which collects the attribute mappings into a knowledge base; section 5 intro-
duces the knowledgebase queries; section 6 discusses related work, whilst section 7 
concludes and discusses future directions of F-SAMS research and development. 
2 The F-SAMS model 
In a F-SAMS federated environment, users can access resources from SPs without 
any prior interactions taking place between the SP and the user’s IdP/AA. Fig. 1 de-
  
picts a typical access control request by a user’s agent. When the SP receives the re-
quest, it first discovers the user’s IdP/AA and then redirects the user’s agent to there, 
along with an authentication and attribute request. As the IdP/AA has no existing 
relationship with the SP, it does not want to release the user’s personal information 
(attributes) until it knows that the SP is a trusted member of the federation. The 
IdP/AA queries F-SAMS with the SP’s X.509 public key certificate (PKC). F-SAMS 
looks up the SP in its trust base and returns the result to the IdP/AA. If the SP is a 
trusted federation member, the IdP/AA can continue with authenticating the user. The 
IdP/AA returns a signed attribute response to the SP, via the user’s agent. When the 
SP receives the response, it must first validate the IdP/AA and its attributes before 
granting access to the user. The SP queries F-SAMS i) to determine if the IdP/AA is 
in the trust base, and ii) to discover the semantics of the IdP/AA’s attributes. If the 
IdP/AA is a trusted federation member, F-SAMS returns a set of mapped federation 
attributes, which the SP can use to make an access control decision. 
 
Fig. 1. – F-SAMS access control process 
The F-SAMS model revolves around the trust and vocabulary expression 
(TruVEx) document that is published by each IdP/AA member or candidate member 
of a federation. Each document contains three parts: 
- the X.509 PKC of the (candidate) member. This can be a self-signed certificate, 
or one issued by a CA. The only restriction is that it must contain the 
uniformResourceIdentifier component of the subject alternative name (SAN) exten-
sion and hold the URI of the web location storing the detached signature of the mem-
ber’s TruVEx document. The candidate member determines this URI at the time his 
PKC is issued, even though the location will initially be empty. 
- an attribute mapping part, expressing in RDF the relationships between the attrib-
utes in the (candidate) member’s local vocabulary and those in the federation vocabu-
lary. Each of the member’s vocabularies are aligned with those of the other members 
using the federation vocabulary as the common ontology that binds them all together. 
By aligning the vocabularies with the federation ontology, relationships will automat-
ically be inferred between the attributes of the separate organizational vocabularies 
without any of them possessing prior knowledge of the other vocabularies. The feder-
ation vocabulary is published by the federation root of trust (FRoT), the FRoT being 
the organization that initially establishes the federation and invites other candidate 
members to join. As the federation evolves, the FRoT may dynamically expand the 
federation vocabulary to include other attributes that are of interest to the federation’s 
members, and members may update their TruVEx documents accordingly. This al-
lows finer grained access controls to be introduced. 
-  a friends part, which contains for each friend (i.e. candidate member that this 
member (the introducer) asserts to be trustworthy): their PKC and the hash of the 
attribute mapping part of their TruVEx document. The PKC enables the TruVEx doc-
ument of the friend to be discovered, as the SAN extension points to the TruVEx 
detached signature and the signature points to the TruVEx document. By including 
the hash of the attribute mapping part, this stops it from being undetectably altered 
after the introducer has validated it. 
Each member signs his TruVEx document using the private key corresponding to 
the public key in the first part of the document, and stores the detached signature at 
the URI contained in the SAN field of his PKC. 
An example federation is shown in Fig. 2. where each named square represents the 
TruVEx document published by a member of the federation. 
A web crawler starts from the TruVEx document of the FRoT, and crawls the web 
picking up the TruVEx documents of other federation and candidate members and 
from these it constructs the centralized federation knowledgebase and trust base.  
The notion of a “friend” is used in the TruVEx document to refer to an organiza-
tion whose attribute mappings are trusted by the organization asserting the friendship 
(the introducer). This “friendship” is not required to be mutual; instead it merely indi-
cates that one organization (the introducer) trusts, or has confidence in, another organ-
ization’s semantic attribute mappings. All candidate members are given a trust score 
based on this friendship. As more members add a candidate member to their friends’ 
parts, then the candidate organization’s trust score increases until it is sufficient to 
reach the trust threshold required to become a member of the federation. The new 
member is then assigned a level of trust by F-SAMS, but this trust level decreases, the 
further the member is away from the FRoT. A member’s trust level is used in compu-
ting the trust score of new federation candidates that this member introduces (as a 
friend). A fuller description of the trust model and trust scoring mechanism is outside 
the scope of this document. 
A TruVEx document is signed for two reasons: the first is to prove the integrity of 
the document’s content, and the second is to verify the assertions made about friends 
that the introducer trusts. This is similar to a signed X.509 PKC where the signer 
asserts that the public key mentioned in the certificate belongs to the named subject of 
the certificate. In the F-SAMS case, the introducer is asserting that he has confidence 
  
that his friend’s attributes do map into the federation agreed ones as specified in the 
friend’s TruVEx document. 
Members can update and re-sign their TruVEx documents as often as they want, 
with the following provisos: 
─ each time the document is signed its detached signature must be stored at the 
signature URI contained in the SAN field of the signer’s PKC (otherwise no-one 
will be able to verify the document’s integrity) 
─ if a member changes his asymmetric key pair or PKC or attribute mapping part 
he must notify the introducers who have his details stored in the friends’ parts of 
their TruVEx documents (see Fig.2). 
Fig. 2.  – A TruVEx document from an example F-SAMS federation 
A member can update his friends list as often as he wishes without notifying any-
one. However, when a member updates the attribute mapping part of its TruVEx doc-
ument, this alters the hash value so that it no longer matches those published by the 
introducers of this document. For the document to remain trusted and for F-SAMS to 
process it, each introducer must re-validate and re-publish the new hash of the attrib-
ute mapping part. To assist with the automation of updating the attribute mapping 
part, members should maintain a separate list of introducers (LOI) that will contain 
the email addresses of their introducers. The LOI can then be used to inform the in-
troducers when the attribute mappings are updated. The introducers can either con-
firm the mappings are valid and update their friend’s entry accordingly, or if the map-
pings are no longer valid, the friend’s entry can be removed as this member is no 
longer trusted by the introducer. If the introducer does nothing, it is equivalent to the 
latter.  
The member’s X.509 PKC is used for verification of the distinguished name (DN) 
and public key of the member. Note that a member may assert its own DN, by issuing 
a self-signed certificate, but its friends will validate this when they add the member to 
their friends’ lists. The PKC is used by the crawler to confirm the subject’s DN with 
the one constructed from the friend assertions made by already trusted introducers in 
their TruVEx documents. The PKC is also used to confirm that the TruVEx document 
was signed by the correct entity. Thus F-SAMS does not rely on, nor require, any CA 
infrastructure. The validated member’s PKC is stored in the certificate base by the 
crawler, for subsequent use by other federation members. 
The FRoT’s TruVEx document contains additional information to the members’ 
TruVEx documents. It contains the SP members part and the federation vocabulary 
part. The SP members part contains a list of (possibly self-signed) X.509 PKCs of SPs 
that are trusted members of the federation. The FRoT has validated that these public 
keys do belong to the named SP members. They can be used for authenticating the 
SPs in message exchanges. The federation vocabulary part contains the vocabulary 
that the members of the federation will base their attribute mappings on.  
3 The Attribute Mappings 
The attribute mapping part of a TruVEx document conveys via RDF statements which 
attributes the IdP/AA assigns to its users and shows how they relate to the federa-
tion’s attributes. The federation vocabulary is made up of a subset of concepts and 
object properties from the SUMO upper common ontology [4], supplemented by F-
SAMS, as shown in Fig. 3 and Table 1. The F-SAMS upper common ontology in Fig. 
3 shows how the SUMO (sumo) and F-SAMS (fed) concepts and object properties 
connect. We have extended the SUMO Attribute concept to include IdentityAttribute, 
with a subclass of EmailAddress. This allows IdPs/AAs to define their own identity 
attributes (as subclasses) and map them into the federation vocabulary. The Organiza-
tion concept from SUMO has been extended to include the three types of organization 
that F-SAMS will encounter: IdP, AA, and SP. IdPs/AAs will classify themselves as 
one or both of these, whilst the FRoT will classify the SPs. Fig. 3 also shows the ob-
ject properties (defined in Table. 1) used in F-SAMS. 
 
Relationship Object property Definition of object property 
Superior 
role/attribute 
sumo:subAttribute The object of the triple is a subordinate 
attribute of the subject of the triple 
Equivalent or bet-
ter 
sumo:equal The subject of the triple is at least equiva-
lent to the object of the triple 
Property of sumo:property The object of the triple is an attribute of 
the subject (any entity) of the triple 
Assigns fed:assigns The object of the triple is an identity at-
tribute assigned by the subject of the triple 




Fig. 3. – The F-SAMS upper common ontology 
This upper common ontology is then extended by the FRoT to include the federa-
tion’s application specific objects and attributes. All concepts in the F-SAMS ontolo-
gy are related using the rdfs:subClassOf property. Individuals are connected to their 
concept via the rdf:type property. All attributes are represented as type/value pairs 
(e.g. Role=Professor), and are instances of their attribute type concept. These attrib-
utes may be hierarchically related to each other (i.e. superior or subordinate) and the 
SUMO property subAttribute is used to define the subordinate attribute relationship. 
When an IdP/AA asserts that one of its attributes is equivalent to a federation attrib-
ute, the SUMO equal relationship is used. When an IdP/AA wishes to map one of its 
identity attributes to a non-equivalent federation attribute, the IdP/AA attribute must 
be superior to the federation attribute.  
 
Fig. 4. – Example attribute mappings 
A pictorial example of (a subset of) a federation vocabulary that might be used by 
an academic federation is shown on the right hand side of Fig. 4. This is taken from 
the eduPerson schema [3]. The left hand side shows the mappings that might be made 
by the OrgB IdP, which issues two types of attribute: academic roles (in a hierarchy) 
and two unrelated affiliate roles. OrgB is linked to its attribute values using the as-
signs property. Some of these can be mapped into equivalent federation eduPerson 
Affiliation attribute values. Other relationships can be inferred from these mappings. 
For example, the AcademicRole=Lecturer attribute is equivalent to the eduPerson 
Affiliation=faculty attribute. As AcademicRole=Lecturer is a subAttribute of 
AcademicRole=Professor, it can be inferred that AcademicRole=Professor is also 
equivalent to eduPersonAffiliation=faculty. Similarly, eduPersonAffiliation=member 
is a subAttribute of eduPersonAffiliation=student, and the latter is a subAttribute of 
eduPersonAffiliation=faculty, therefore both AcadmicRole=Lecturer and Academic 
Role=Professor will inherit the privileges of eduPersonAffiliation=faculty, eduPerson 
Affiliation=student and eduPersonAffiliation=member. Fig. 2 shows part of Table 2 
represented as RDF in OrgB’s TruVex document. 
 
Subject Predicate Object 
AcademicRole subClassOf IdentityAttribute 
eduPersonAffiliation subClassOf IdentityAttribute 
AcademicRole=Professor type AcademicRole 
OrgB assigns AcademicRole=Professor 
AcademicRole=Professor subAttribute AcademicRole=Lecturer 
AffiliateRole=Cleaner type AffiliateRole 
eduPersonAffiliation=staff type eduPersonAffiliation 
eduPersonAffiliation=staff subAttribute eduPersonAffiliation=member 
AffiliateRole=Cleaner equal eduPersonAffiliation=staff 
Table 2. – Example triples from Fig.4 
4 The Crawler 
The crawler is the element of F-SAMS that discovers the vocabularies, verifies the 
documents, and builds the knowledgebase, trust base and certificate base. The crawler 
runs periodically to maintain and update the information. The crawler is initialized 
with the PKC of the FRoT and the URI of the FRoT’s TruVEx document. The crawl-
er begins by retrieving the FRoT’s TruVEx document, which it verifies with the PKC, 
before dissecting it to extract the various parts. The FRoT’s federation vocabulary 
part contains the federation ontology, which F-SAMS uses as the foundation for the 
knowledgebase. The SP members part is used to create the list of SP PKCs in the F-
SAMs certificate store. Only these SPs will be entitled to use the web service to vali-
date IdPs/AAs and their attributes. The FRoT’s friends’ information is used to create 
the crawler’s initial list of friends (LOF). As the FRoT is fully trusted, its friends are 
trusted to join the federation as IdPs/AAs, and their certificates are added to the F-
SAMs certificate store. However, their trust levels are set to a reduced level. The 
crawler then works through the LOF to read, verify and analyze their trusted TruVEx 
documents. As it does so, it dynamically updates the knowledgebase from their attrib-
ute mapping parts, and its LOF and internal certificate store from their friend’s parts. 
The crawler then proceeds to compute the trust scores of the friends of the friends of 
  
the FRoT, using the entries in its LOF. The more friends a candidate member has, the 
higher its trust score. If a candidate does not have a trust score which passes the re-
quired membership threshold, its details (PKC and hash) are still added to the LOF, 
but the TruVEx document is not read in or processed until its trust score satisfies the 
membership threshold. Once this occurs, the crawler computes a reduced trust level 
for this new member, adds its PKC to the F-SAMS certificate store, reads in its 
TruVEx document, validates it, then includes its friends in its LOF and its attribute 
mapping part in the F-SAMS knowledge base. The crawler continues this process 
until either no more entries are added to its LOF, or no more trusted candidates re-
main unprocessed. Once the crawl is complete, any candidates with a trust score un-
der the threshold are kept in the LOF, but are not included in the trust base, so that 
SP’s only have access to a completely trusted set of IdPs/AAs and their attribute 
mappings. Periodically, at a frequency determined by the FRoT, the crawler starts to 
crawl the federation again, starting with the TruVEx document of the FRoT. If a pre-
viously trusted member become untrusted, then its details are removed from the F-
SAMS certificate, knowledge and trust bases. 
5 F-SAMS Queries 
To query F-SAMS, the SP establishes a TLS session with the F-SAMS web service, 
and sends a request containing the PKC and the (unknown to the SP) attribute(s) of 
the issuing IdP/AA. F-SAMS initially attempts to retrieve the trust score for the 
IdP/AA from its trust base, and if it is found, will proceed to map the IdP/AA’s attrib-
ute(s) into federation attributes. The response to the SP contains one of the following: 
- a response code of -2 if the IdP/AA is not trusted; 
- the trust score of the IdP/AA (which will always be above the membership 
threshold), followed by one of the following for each IdP/AA attribute: 
o a response code of 1 and the mapped federation attribute, or 
o a response code of 0 and the dominant federation attribute, meaning that 
the attribute is known to F-SAMS but is not equivalent to or superior to 
any federation attribute. The dominant federation attribute represents the 
closest match. The SP can then unilaterally decide to either grant the 
unknown attribute equivalent or downgraded privileges compared to the 
dominant federation attribute, or simply ignore it.  
o a response code of -1 when the attribute is unknown to F-SAMS. 
As the knowledgebase is built by aligning only vocabularies that are fully trusted, i.e. 
from IdPs and AAs that have a trust score of at least the threshold, the relationships 
returned by F-SAMS can be completely trusted even though the trust is transitive and 
not direct. This is because each SP has complete trust in the FRoT, and through 
chains of trust from the FRoT to every IdP/AA member in the federation, trust re-
mains strong regardless of how far that latter is away from the FRoT, since more in-
troducer chains are needed the further an IdP/AA is away from the FRoT. 
An IdP or AA may query F-SAMS to determine whether an SP is a trusted member 
of the federation. An IdP/AA establishes a TLS connection with F-SAMS and sends 
the SP’s PKC. F-SAMS checks the certificate base and returns a binary response of 
true if the SP is a federation member, and false if not. 
6 Related Work 
Our work is related to the work presented in [5], OBIS, which enables semantic in-
teroperability within federations. More specifically, the knowledgebase that we pre-
sent is a relationship lookup service similar to OBIS. However, OBIS is grounded in 
natural language, whereas F-SAMS is based on the standardized RDF and OWL lan-
guages [6, 7]. In addition to the relationship lookup service, we present a federation 
infrastructure for building the knowledge base and a trust model for dynamically ex-
panding the IdP/AA membership. 
The Semantic Access Control (SAC) Model [8] was specifically designed to en-
force ABAC policies in heterogeneous and distributed environments. It maps policies 
to resources dynamically based on the semantics of policies and resources. F-SAMS 
allows the SP to keep their existing policies, mapping instead the user’s attributes into 
their local SP equivalents. 
The Semantic Access Control Enabler (SACE) [9] was developed to enforce 
RBAC when accessing heterogeneous databases. This approach allows each organiza-
tion to define their resources as concepts (classes) and then use schema mapping 
techniques to resolve the semantic interoperability. Thus, the SP’s resources in the 
request can be mapped to concepts representing a resource in the ontology by a trust-
ed third party mediator which makes the access control decisions on behalf of the SP. 
So the permissions are associated to classes in the ontology rather than to the actual 
resources. In comparison, F-SAMS leaves the access control decisions in the hands of 
the SP and maps the requester’s roles/attributes into SP understood ones, rather than 
mapping the requested resources. F-SAMS therefore has wider applicability. 
 [10, 11] both suggest the use of RDF ontologies to create and manage policies, 
whereas, [12] extends this presenting the ROWLBAC model, which discusses the use 
of OWL to represent policies in RBAC. They argue that the use of established access 
control techniques (such as XACML) requires all roles to be established at initializa-
tion time and it is therefore advantageous to use OWL to generate policies. F-SAMS 
similarly does not require all roles to be known at initialization time, but enables the 
dynamic mapping of roles/attributes rather than the dynamic generation of policies. 
7 Conclusions and future work 
We have presented F-SAMS, a web services based system for use in federations to 
enhance interoperability, using semantic mappings to understand attributes from un-
known IdPs and AAs. Its trust model allows for the automatic sharing of vocabularies 
between members, and using levels of trust, ensures that SPs can have complete trust 
in the mappings without even knowing the IdP/AA or its vocabulary. Combining a 
trust base and a knowledge base allows SPs to not only verify attribute assertions 
from an unknown IdP or AA, but also interpret the unknown request attributes. This 
  
provides flexibility within the federation, as IdP/AAs do not have to update their at-
tributes to accommodate the federation attributes. Instead, they can map their attrib-
utes into the federation’s, where they can be securely collected and stored centrally 
for SPs to query whenever unknown attributes are encountered. It also means that the 
SPs and IdP/AAs do not have to engage in any prior trust relationships. 
Future work will include the design and building of a vocabulary creator that will 
allows members to create, edit and sign their TruVEx documents using a GUI. The F-
SAMS infrastructure will be extended to allow SPs to dynamically introduce new SPs 
to a federation, and to include Levels of Assurance in IdPs. 
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